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This paper examines the  detetminants of the  stockholder reactions  to  convertible debt 
announcements  made  by  Western  European  companies.  We  simultaneously  test  the 
impact of issuer characteristics, security design features, the stated uses of proceeds and 
the  aggregate  convertible  debt  issue  volume.  Our  evidence  suggests  that  the 
announcement returns are positively influenced by the maturity and conversion premium, 
and negatively influenced by the  Eurobond feature,  the level of post-conversion equity 
dilution  and  the  aggregate  convetiible  debt  volume.  We  also  document  significant 
interaction effects between the issuer characteristics, the convertible debt design and the 
convetiible  debt  market  condition.  First,  we  find  that  hot  market  convertibles  are 
structured to be more 'debt-like' than non-hot market convertibles. Second, we show that 
the influence of the issuer characteristics depends on the convertible debt design: equity-
like  convertibles  are  perceived  as  instruments  able  to  reduce  adverse  selection  and 
financial  distress  costs,  whereas  debt-like  conveliibles are  perceived as  predominantly 
straight debt.  Lastly, we  demonstrate that issuer and security characteristics have much 
more power for explaining the investor reactions during non-hot markets than during hot 
markets  . 
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1. Introduction 
There is  broad consensus  in the  empirical finance  literature regarding the  sign and the 
size of the convertible debt announcement effect. Most studies find that convertible debt 
announcements tend to  be accompanied by negative abnormal stock returns that lie  in-
between  the  abnonnal  stock  returns  traditionally  reported  for  straight  debt  and  pure 
equity  announcements.!  By contrast,  there  is  no  systematic  evidence  thus  far  on  the 
detenninants of the convertible debt announcement effect. The literature provides three 
impOliant theoretical models yielding predictions on these determinants, being the 'asset 
substitution' model of Green (1984), the 'risk unceliainty' model of Brennan and Kraus 
(1987) and the  'backdoor-equity' moael of Stein (1992). In this paper, we  examine the 
ability of these models to explain the stock price reactions to convertible debt offering 
announcements  made  by  Western  European  companies.  While  prior  empirical  work 
focuses on firm-specific detelminants of the conveliible debt announcement returns, our 
study  simultaneously examines  the  influence of the  issuer characteristics,  the  security 
design, the officially stated uses of the offering proceeds and the aggregate conveliible 
debt issue volume on the stockholder reactions. In this way, we obtain new insights on 
the variables driving the convertible debt announcement effect. 
With respect  to  the  security  design  characteristics,  we  find  that  the  convertible  debt 
maturity and conversion premium have  a significantly positive impact on the  investor 
reactions, whereas the Eurobond dummy (indicating convertibles issued on the Eurobond 
market) and the  level  of post-conversion equity dilution have  a significantly negative 
impact.  These  results  are  in  line  with the  predictions  yielded by  the  conveliible  debt 
models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992). We also show that 
the  announcement  returns  are  significantly  negatively  affected  by  the  aggregate 
conveliible  debt  issue  volume.  This  finding  may  reflect  investors'  suspicion  that  hot 
market conveliible debt offerings are inspired by opportunistic motives (e.g. the wish to 
take  advantage of a temporary  equity overvaluation)  or  by  irrational market fads  (i.e. 
1 See Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) and de Roon and Veld (1998) and for an overview of the conveltible 
debt announcement returns recorded by existing studies. 2 
'me-too issuance'). By contrast, our results on the impact of the stated uses of proceeds 
are mostly insignificant. Probably, this can be ascribed to the fact that the majority of the 
convetiible debt issuers state more than one possible application of the offering proceeds, 
so that it is almost impossible to disentangle the influences of separate intended purposes 
of issue. 
The  mam  contribution  of this  paper  is  the  documentation  of significant  interactions 
between  the  issuer  characteristics,  the  security  design  features  and  the  aggregate 
convetiible  debt  volume.  First,  we  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  significant  association 
between the convertible debt security design and the convetiible debt market condition: 
hot  market  convertibles  have  a  more  debt-like  security  design  than  non-hot  market 
convertibles.  Second,  we  show  that  the  influence  of  issuer  characteristics  on  the 
announcement  returns  depends  on  the  convertible  debt  security  design:  for  relatively 
more  equity-like  convertibles,  our  results  are  in  accordance  with the  convertible  debt 
model of Stein (1992), whereas for relatively more debt-like convertibles, our results are 
similar to the ones that would be expected for straight debt offering announcements. The 
impact of the issuer characteristics also depends on the convetiible debt market condition: 
during hot markets, stockholders are much more wonied about firm overvaluation than 
during  non-hot  markets.  Lastly,  we  discover  that  the  issuer  and  security  design 
characteristics have a lot more power for explaining the investor reactions during non-hot 
issue  windows  than during  hot  issue  windows.  According  to  Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996),  who obtain an  analogous  finding  in the  context of equity offerings, this  result 
may either be  explained by  lower information asymmetries  or  by stockholder herding 
behavior during hot market conditions. More specifically, it could be  that stockholders 
resort to a collective (negative) evaluation of all convetiible debt offering announcements 
made during hot issue periods, inespective of  the specific issuer and issue characteristics. 
Our research extends the recent US-based paper of Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2003), 
who also acknowledge the importance of security design and market condition variables 
for  explaining  the  convetiible  debt  announcement  returns.  Lewis  et  al.  (2003) 
characterize the convertible debt security design by means of one measure, being the risk-3 
neutral probability of conversion.2 They use this variable only for examining whether the 
influence  of finn-specific  variables  on the  investor  reactions  differs  across  relatively 
more  equity-like  and  relatively  more  debt-like  convertibles.  By  contrast,  our  study 
explicitly  investigates  the  influence of several  detailed security  design aspects  on the 
convertible  debt  announcement  effect.  Furthermore,  Lewis  et  al.  (2003)  examine  the 
influence of the aggregate equity issue volume on the announcement returns, and find that 
convertibles issued during hot issue windows are accompanied by more favorable stock 
price reactions. By contrast, we test the influence of the aggregate convertible debt issue 
volume, which leads to the new insights discussed above. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as  follows.  In the next section, we review the 
theoretical models yielding the testable predictions for  our study.  Section 3 documents 
the sample and provides some descriptive statistics. In Section 4 and 5, we present our 
empirical  results  on  the  announcement  returns  and  their  determinants.  Section  6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Investor reactions to announcements of convertible debt issuances 
Due to the hybrid nature of convertibles, the investor reactions to the announcements of 
these  securities  can be  studied  from  two  different  perspectives.  According  to  Green 
(1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987), convertible debt is  an instrument to mitigate the 
costs  associated  with  straight  debt  offerings.  By  contrast,  Stein  (1992)  argues  that 
conveliible debt is an instrument to avoid the costs associated with pure equity offerings. 
This  section  briefly  discusses  each  of  these  viewpoints,  and  lists  their  testable 
implications for the influence of issuer characteristics, security design features, the stated 
uses of the  offering proceeds and the  aggregate  convertible  debt issue  volume on the 
convertible debt announcement returns. 
2 The risk-neutral probability of conversion is the likelihood that a convertible will be converted into equity 
over its lifetime, calculated under the Black-Scholes (1973) assumptions (cf.  Section 3 for a more detailed 
defmition of this variable). 4 
2.1. Convertible debt as a substitute for straight debt 
Green (1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) both present convetiible debt as  a solution 
to  a capital market imperfection induced by straight debt, but differ with respect to  the 
specific  debt-related  cost  that  they  assume  to  be  reduced  by  this  hybrid  security. 
According to Green (1984), convetiibles are able to  mitigate asset substitution costs that 
arise from the presence of risky debt. The reason is that, by altering the parameters of the 
convetiible debt contract (i.e., the conversion ratio and the exercise price), stockholders 
can control the shape of their residual claim, and thus their own incentives to  take risk. 
Following Brennan and Kraus  (1987)  in  turn,  convetiible  debt  is  able  to  reduce  the 
adverse selection problem that occurs when management and investors do  not share the 
same  opinion on firm  risk.  The reason is  that the  impact of finn risk  increases on the 
bond  component  of the  convertible  will  be  partly  offset  by  the  impact  of finn  risk 
increases on its equity component,  so  that its  total  value will be largely unaffected by 
changes  in  the  company  risk.  Convertible  debt  investors  will  thus  require  a  lower 
compensation premium for possible finn risk increases than straight debt investors, which 
reduces the adverse selection costs. 
Green (1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) predict that stockholders should react more 
favorably upon convertible debt announcements made by finns with high potential for 
asset substitution and risk uncertainty, i.e.  highly levered, high-risk companies? These 
models  also  yield several testable hypotheses on the  influence  of the  convetiible  debt 
security design on the announcement returns. First, the inclusion of a conversion option 
in straight debt with a long  maturity should be  associated with more  positive  investor 
reactions, since the  conversion option reduces the potential for  risk-increasing  shifts in 
corporate investment policies associated with long maturities. Second, convertibles issued 
on the Eurobond market should be accompanied by more negative announcement returns. 
The  reasoning  behind  this  hypothesis  is  the  following.  According  to  Kim  and  Stulz 
3 The hypotheses derived in this section hinge on the assumption that the existing stockholders have to bear 
the  entire  asset  substitution  and  risk  uncertainty  costs  (in  the  form  of a  higher  risk  premium  on  the 
corporate debt). In Section 5 of this paper, we provide an overview of the different film-specific variables 
that will be used for proxying these costs. 5 
(1992), Eurobond conveliible debt offerings may be  uniquely confined to  firms  with a 
low risk level, because the covenants on Eurobond issues are very difficult to enforce. If 
the Eurobond feature indeed acts as an inverse proxy for finn risk, we expect a negative 
influence  of this  variable  on  the  investor  reactions,  since  asset  substitution  and  risk 
uncertainty problems should be less severe for low risk firms.  In addition, the Brelman 
and Kraus (1987) model predicts that the conveliible debt announcement retmTIS  will be 
positively associated with the  conversion premium and  negatively  associated with the 
degree of equity dilution at full conversion of the convertible debt.4  With respect to the 
stated uses of the offering proceeds, Green (1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) imply 
that conveliible debt issues intended to  pay back shOli-tenn debt and conveliible debt 
issues with vague stated uses of proceeds (such as  'general corporate purposes') should 
be accompanied by more favorable investor reactions. The reason is that such offerings 
create more opportunities for future  finn risk increases, which makes the inclusion of a 
conversion option more appropriate. Finally, these models generate the prediction that the 
aggregate convertible debt issue volume should have a positive influence on the investor 
reactions. The rationale behind this hypothesis is the following. According to Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996), the economy-wide level of equity-related adverse selection problems 
may fluctuate over time. By extension, Lewis et al.  (2003) argue that debt-related asset 
substitution and risk uncertainty costs could also have a time-varying component, e.g. due 
to  temporal variations  in the  availability of profitable investment oppOliunities.  If this 
assumption holds, we  expect convertible debt offerings to  cluster during periods when 
these debt-related problems are more severe, since that is when they are most appropriate 
(at  least,  according  to  Green  (1984)  and Brennan  and  Kraus  (1987)).  The  aggregate 
convertible debt issue volume might thus act as  a proxy for the economy-wide level of 
asset substitution and risk unceliainty costs, which implies that it should have a positive 
influence on the announcement returns. 
4  Brennan  and  Kraus  (1987)  obtain  these  two  security  design  hypotheses  by  taking  the  first  order 
derivatives of the firm type that investors infer from the issued security type with respect to the face value 
and the  conversion ratio of the convertible debt.  The conversion premium is  linearly related to the face 
value of the conveltible debt, since it is  equal to the conveltible debt face value divided by the conversion 
ratio.  In  tum,  the  post-conversion  equity  dilution  is  positively  (although  not  linearly)  related  to  the 
conversion  ratio,  since  it  is  equal  to  the  number  of shares  issued  assuming  full  conversion  of the 
convertibles divided by (1) the total number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end before the offering 
announcement and (2) the number of shares issued assuming full conversion. 6 
2.2. Conveliible debt as a substitute for equity 
According to  Stein (1992),  companies use  convertibles as  an  indirect equity financing 
that mitigates the adverse selection problem described by Myers and Majluf (1984). The 
higher  the  firm's  financial  distress  costs,  the  more  credible  is  the  conveliible  debt 
offering as  a signal of optimism,  since the  finn will only  be  able  to  avoid bankruptcy 
through a conversion-forcing convertible bond call if its stock price is high enough. This 
'backdoor-equity'  rationale  implies  that  firm-specific  proxy  variables  for  the  level  of 
adverse selection and financial distress costs should positively affect the convertible debt 
announcement returns.5  In addition, it yields some testable hypotheses on the impact of 
specific  call  features  on the  investor  reactions.6  First,  since  forced  conversion  of the 
convertibles  through  a  convertible  bond  call  will  only  happen  if the  stock  price  is 
sufficiently high, managers that expect their stock price to increase more slowly will want 
to call the convertibles later. The length of the call protection period should thus have a 
negative  influence  on the  convertible  debt  announcement  returns.  Second,  since  soft 
callable conveliibles can only be called if the stock price exceeds a certain trigger value 
during a certain time period, the inclusion of a soft call feature signals that management 
expects  the  stock  price  to  rise  (at  least)  to  this  trigger  level.7  Hence,  soft  callable 
convertibles  should be associated with more  positive  announcement returns  than hard 
callable  convertibles.  Stein's  (1992)  model  also  implies  that  conveliibles  with  vague 
intended uses  of proceeds should induce more favorable  investor reactions,  since  such 
offerings  create  more  unceliainty  about  the  actual  intentions  of the  issuing  finn (and 
hence, larger adverse selection costs). Finally, this model generates the prediction that the 
convertible  debt  announcement  effect  will  be  positively  influenced  by  the  aggregate 
convertible  debt  issue  volume.  The  reason  is  that,  if convertibles  are  indeed  more 
5 Again, we assume that the adverse selection and fmancial distress costs are entirely bome by the existing 
shareholders. In Section 5, we present the firm-specific variables that will be used for proxying these costs. 
6 Since Stein (1992) a priori assumes that all convertibles are callable, this model yields no direct prediction 
about the influence of  the call feature an sich. 
7 If the stock price does not reach this threshold level, the firm will be prohibited from calling the bond. In 
the setting of the Stein (1992) model, this implies that the firm will eventually go  bankrupt due to a too 
high debt level. 7 
appropriate for  finns facing high adverse selection costs, we can expect them to  group 
during  periods when these  problems  are  more  severe.  The  aggregate  convertible  debt 
issue volume  might thus  act  as  a proxy for  the  economy-wide  level  of equity-related 
costs, which implies that it should have a positive impact on the stockholder reactions. 
We conclude this  theoretical  overview with two  impOliant  caveats  with respect to  the 
models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992). First, we need to 
point out that  these  convertible  debt  rationales  should  not  be  considered  as  mutually 
exclusive explanations of convertible debt issuance, since companies can decide to issue 
convertibles in order to mitigate various combinations of debt- and equity-related costs 
(Lewis et al., 2003). Second, we should emphasize that the above-mentioned models are 
only valid for convertibles that have a substantial probability of actually being convelied 
into equity.s If  the conversion probability of the convertible debt is too low, investors will 
perceive this security rather as a fonn of straight debt than as an instrument able to reduce 
debt- and/or equity-related costs. 
3. Sample selection and data description 
3.1. Sample selection procedure 
The sample of convertible debt issues used in this study was constructed as follows. First, 
we collected a list of all convertible debt offerings made by Westem European companies 
during the period 1990-2002 from Bloomberg. This resulted in an initial dataset of 524 
convertibles. 
8 Whereas Green (1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) explicitly mention that their models only pertain to 
'appropriately designed' convettibles (in tenns of conversion premium and conversion ratio), Stein (1992) 
makes no such statement. However, since the latter author claims that convettible debt is a fOtm of  delayed 
equity, he implicitly requires this security to have a considerable probability of  actually being converted. 8 
Subsequently, we  applied the  following  criteria to  select offerings for  inclusion in our 
final sample: 
The offering must be made by an industrial company (not by a financial company or 
a regulated public utility); 
The  offering  must  be  convertible  in  the  IssUlng  finn's  stock  (this  excludes 
exchangeable bonds); 
The issuing finn's accounting data for the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the 
announcement date must be available on Datastream; 
The  issuing firm's daily  stock price data for  the  full  calendar year preceding the 
announcement date must be available on Datastream; 
Security design data must be available on Bloomberg; 
The offering announcement date must be available on Bloomberg; 
The  offering announcement date  should not  include  other confounding  corporate 
event announcements (e.g.  announcements of dividend payments or other security 
offerings).9 
These requirements were met by 256 convertibles offered by 195 different firms. 
3.2. Data description 
As outlined in Section 1,  our study examines the influence of finn and security design 
characteristics, of  the officially stated uses of  proceeds and of  the convertible debt market 
condition on the convertible debt announcement returns. This paragraph provides some 
descriptive statistics on each of these explanatory variable categories.  We  start with an 
overview of the geographical dispersion of our sample firms. 
9 For identifying the confounding announcements, we used the Bloomberg Corporate Actions Calendar, the 
Financial Times World Press Monitor, and the company websites. 9 
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics on the countries of  domicile of  the issuingfirms 
Table I  shows that more than one-third of our sample  offerings  are  issued by French 
companies. This finding is not surprising, since it is  generally known that the European 
convettible debt market is dominated by French issuers. to 
«Insert Table I about here» 
3.2.2. Descriptive statistics on firm and security design characteristics 
From rows (1) to (6) of Table II, we can derive that the convertible debt issuers in our 
sample are large firms with a high market to book ratio and volatile stock returns. The 
table also reveals that a convertible debt issuance tends to have a substantial impact on 
the issuing finn's financial structure. More specifically, row (8) shows that the average 
convettible  debt  offering  represents  18%  of the  market  value  of the  issuing  finn's 
common equity, and row (9) indicates that the average convertible debt offering dilutes 
the issuing finn's common equity by 22% (upon full conversion). 
«Insert Table II about here» 
As can be seen from rows (14)  and (15), the large majority of the  convertibles in our 
sample have a soft or hard call feature. 11  Row (16) indicates that approximately one-third 
of  our  sample  issues  are  Eurobonds.  The  remaining  offerings  are  predominantly 
domestic:  only three convertibles  are  issued on a  foreign  bond market (not reported). 
Finally, row (17) reveals that 7.81 % or 20 of our 256 sample observations encompass a 
privately placed tranche.  Only two of these offerings are  entirely privately placed (not 
reported), which implies that we will not be able to analyze the impact of private versus 
public placement of convertible debt on the investor reactions. 
10  For instance, in the attic1e  'Capital markets:  equity  and equity-linked' published in Corporate Finance 
(1999) we read the heading 'French drive conveltibles market'. 
11  Our fmding that most conveltible bonds are callable is consistent with the fmdings repOlted by US-based 
papers (e.g.  Lewis  et al.  (1998)  and  Long  and Sefcik (1990)).  Note that this provides evidence for the 
assumption ofthe Stein (1992) model that callability is a key characteristic of conveltible debt (cf. supra). 10 
Table II shows some striking differences with the figures reported by US-based studies. 
First,  the  mean (median)  finn sizes  (in terms  of total  assets)  and the  mean (median) 
offering  sizes  of our sample  observations  are  much larger than the  numbers  that  are 
usually recorded for US-based convertible debt samples, even if we take  inflation into 
account.12 This could be due to the fact that, in Europe, only the largest firms tend to be 
quoted.  Second, the mean (median) maturity of the convertibles in our sample is much 
shOl1er than the mean (median) maturities repOl1ed for US convertibles.13 
In addition to the readily-available security design measures repOl1ed in Table II, we also 
calculated the average risk-neutral conversion probability as a descriptive measure for the 
'degree  of equity-likeness'  of our  sample  observations.  The  risk-neutral  conversion 
probability can be defined as  the  likelihood that  a  convel1ible  will be convel1ed  into 
equity over its lifetime, computed under the assumption of a risk-neutral world.  In the 
Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula,  this probability is represented by N(d2), 
where N is the cumulative probability under a standard nOlmal distribution function and 
S  (j'2 
In(-) + (r - div - ~)T 
d2=  -----'X'-.::.....-~---;:::=__-=2 ~  (1) 
(j'.fi 
In equation (1), S  is  the  price of the underlying  stock measured one  week before the 
announcement date,14 X  is the conversion price, r is the continuously compounded yield 
on a  5-year German Treasury Bond measured on the  announcement date,15  div  is  the 
issuing  finn's  continuously  compounded  dividend  yield  for  the  fiscal  year-end 
ilmnediately preceding the announcement date,  (j'  is the volatility per annum estimated 
from the  continuously compounded equity return measured over the  period 240 to  40 
12  For instance, Lewis et al.  (1999) record a mean (median) firm size (in tetms of total assets) of $ 1,025 
mio  ($  288  mio)  and  a  mean  (median)  offering  size  of $  55  mio  (35  mio)  for  their  sample  of US 
convetiibles issued between 1977 and 1984. 
13  For instance, Nanda and Yun (1996) record a mean (median) maturity of 17.92 (16.95) years for their 
sample of  convetiibles issued by US firms between 1987 and 1992. 
14 The stock price is measured one week prior to the announcement date in order to abstract from the impact 
that the convertible debt announcement might have on the issuing film's stock price. 
15 The Getman interest rate plays a leading role in the European economy, hence our choice for the yield on 
a German Treasury Bond. We retrieved this variable from Datastream. 11 
trading days prior to the announcement date, and T is the initial conveliible bond maturity 
(expressed in years). The risk-neutralized drift rate r-div is set to zero if r-div is negative. 
We  find  that  the  average  (median)  risk-neutral  conversion  probability  of our  sample 
offerings is  32.44 (29.85)%, which is  substantially lower than the  50.30% average risk-
neutral conversion probability repOlied for the US-based sample of Lewis et al.  (1999).16 
This  result  is  in  line  with  our  expectations,  since  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that 
European convertibles tend to  be much more  'debt-like'  in nature than their American 
counterparts.  17 
3.2.3. Descriptive statistics on the officially stated uses of  proceeds 
The stated uses of the issue proceeds can be obtained from the offering prospectus. For 
105  offerings,  we  could  retrieve  this  document  from  the  KBC  Financial  Products 
Convertible Debt Database.1S  Since the large majority of conveliible debt issuers mention 
multiple  applications  of the  offering  proceeds,  it  is  hard  to  speak  of 'the'  intended 
purpose of a patiicular convertible. In line with Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997), 
we consider the intended purpose that is listed first in the 'Use of  proceeds' section of  the 
offering  prospectus  as  the  most  impOliant  purpose  of issue.  Colmnn  (1)  of Table  III 
shows  the  frequency  distribution  of the  different  first-mentioned  uses  of proceeds 
recorded for our sample offerings. For completeness, column (2) reports for each purpose 
of issue  the  total  number  (and percentage)  of conveliibles  that mention  this  purpose 
somewhere in the 'Use of  proceeds' section of their offering prospectus. 
«Insert Table III about here» 
16  Lewis  et a1.  (1999) repOlt no median value for the risk-neutral conversion probability  of their sample 
offerings. 
17  For instance, in the 3ltic1e  '2001  ways to use convertibles' published in  Corporate Finance (2001), we 
read:  '[n  the  US,  convertibles have been - and still are - an  equity play.  [n  Europe,  a different attitude 
prevails.  Convertibles are considered debt,  both by the  investors that buy them and the investment banks 
that market them. ' Our study provides formal evidence for this statement. 
18  As the  KBC  Financial  Products  Conveltibles  Debt Database only  contains  information  on  currently 
outstanding  conveltible  debt,  these  105  convertibles  were  mainly  issued  during  the  later  years  of our 
sample period. 12 
From the table, we can derive that almost 50% of the convertible debt issuing firms list 
the refinancing of existing debt or the optimaiisation of their financial structure (mostly in 
tenllS  of maturity)  first  in the  'Use of proceeds'  section of the  offering prospectus.  In 
turn, around 40% of the issuing companies mention the financing of internal or external 
growth as their primary purpose of issue. Most of  the remaining convertibles are intended 
to finance 'general corporate purposes'. 
3.2.4. Descriptive statistics on the convertible debt market condition 
In order to identify the 'hot' convetiible debt issue windows over our sample period, we 
follow  the  procedure  developed  by Bayless  and  Chaplinsky  (1996)  in  the  context  of 
equity offerings. A first step in this procedure involves the computation of the aggregate 
monthly  Western  European  convetiible  debt  issue  volumes  from  January  1990  until 
December 2002. 19  Subsequently, these  aggregate monthly issue volumes are  convetied 
into real terms by means of the monthly European Consumer Price Index obtained from 
the  IMF.  High volume  issue  periods  (hot  markets)  are  then defined  as  at  least  three 
contiguous months where convertible debt issue volume exceeds the upper quartile of a 
three-month moving average of real convertible debt issue volume.2o 
«Insert Table IV about here» 
Table IV specifies the calendar time intervals identified as  hot issue windows.  We  see 
that these windows occur in the middle and at the end of the  sample period. The table 
also reveals that, whereas the hot issue periods make up only 22% of the sample period, 
19  For our  event study, we  require the  availability  of pre-announcement  stock price,  balance  sheet  and 
security design information. Since there is no need for imposing such requirement for the calculation of  the 
aggregate monthly convertible debt issue volumes, these aggregate volumes are based on a considerably 
larger  conveltible  debt  sample  than the  one  used throughout our event  study  (i.e.,  350  instead  of 256 
observations  ). 
20 Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) fmther distinguish between 'cold' and 'normal' issue markets. Cold issue 
markets are defmed as at least three contiguous months where conveltible debt issue volume falls below the 
lower qU31tile  of a three-month moving  average of real  convertible debt  issue  volume, whereas nOlmal 
issue  markets  are  periods when the  convertible debt issue volume  lies  in-between the  upper  and  lower 
moving average cutoffs. However, since this criterion qualifies only 14 of our sample conveltibles as cold 
market  offerings,  we  decided  to  group  the  cold  and  the  nOlmal  market  offerings  into  one  'non-hot' 
conveltible debt category. 13 
59%  or  $  61.74  billion of a  total  $  103.86  billion  in  convertible  debt  (expressed  in 
constant 2002 dollars) is raised during these windows. 
4.  Empirical findings  on the sign and size  of the convertible debt announcement 
effect 
4.1. Methodology 
We calculated the abnonnal announcement returns by means of the  market model, with 
the market index proxied by the Datastream country benchmark index for the country of 
domicile of  the issuing company?! In line with Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and Lewis et 
al. (1999, 2003), we estimated the market model regressions over the pre- and post-event 
estimation windows (-200,-61) and (61,200) measured relative to the announcement dates 
retrieved  from  Bloomberg.  For  assessing  the  statistical  significance  of the  abnormal 
return estimates, we applied the widely-used test statistic developed by Pattel (1976). 
4.2. Results 
Table V provides an overview of  the cumulative abnonnal returns computed over several 
windows  sUlTounding  the  announcement date.  In line  with prior  studies,  we  find  that 
convertible debt  announcements have  a  significantly negative  influence on the  issuing 
finn's stock price. The average day-O abnonnal return is equal to -1.32% (Z =  -7.56) and 
represents the largest daily prediction error in absolute value.  Table V also reveals that 
the  convertible  debt  offerings  in  our  dataset  tend  to  be  announced  after  periods  of 
significant positive  abnormal  stock  returns.  By contrast,  over  the  post-announcement 
window (2,60), there is no significant abnonnal stock price reaction. 
«Insert Table V about here» 
11  The Datastream  country  benchmark  indices  are  synthetic  value-weighted  market  indices.  They  are 
computed analogously for all European countries, which makes them very suitable benchmarks for a cross-
country analysis like ours. 14 
4.3. Robustness checks 
In order to  check the validity of our findings on the sign and the size of the convetiible 
debt announcement returns, we performed the following robustness checks:22 
We  cross-checked  the  announcement  dates  of the  convetiibles  in  our  sample  by 
means of the press releases represented in the Financial Times World Press Monitor 
and  on the  company websites.  For 26  observations,  we  found  some  indication of 
information  leakage  concerning  the  convertible  debt  offering  prior  to  their 
announcement date retrieved from Bloomberg. However, since the exact terms of the 
offering were never released before the Bloomberg announcement date, this  date is 
most appropriate for measuring the impact of specific security design features on the 
abnonnal  returns  (i.e.,  one  of the  main  purposes  of our  study).  When  these  26 
offerings are removed from the sample, our results remain unaffected. 
Since  it  is  well-known that  daily  stock returns  tend to  be  highly non-normal,  we 
cross-checked our  conclusions  drawn  from  the  parametric Pattel  (1976)  Z-test  by 
means of non-parametric sign and Wilcoxon signed rank tests. As  can be  seen from 
the  last two  columns of Table V  supra,  both these  tests confinn our findings  of a 
significantly  negative  convertible  debt  announcement  effect  and  a  significantly 
positive pre-announcement stock runup. 
As  an (admittedly crude) check for  the  influence of thin trading on our results, we 
removed the 32 observations that have more than 30% of zero daily returns over the 
market model estimation window ((-200, -61), (61,200»  from our dataset.  Since the 
findings obtained for the resulting subsample are qualitatively similar to the findings 
obtained for our full sample, we can conclude that our results are probably not largely 
affected by the occurrence of  non-synchronous trading. 
Since  up  to  66.80%  of the  announcement  date  abnormal  returns  are  negative  (cf. 
Table V supra) and over 90% of  these returns are between -6 and +6% (not repOlied), 
we can conclude that our results are not driven by the OCCUlTence  of a small number 
22 For brevity, we don't report the detailed results of our robustness tests here. These results are available 
upon request. 15 
of outliers.  It is  also  wOlih  noting  that  the  day-O  abnormal  returns  are  negative 
throughout our different sample years and sample countries.23 
5.  Empirical findings  on  the  determinants  of the  convertible  debt announcement 
returns 
This section presents an analysis of the influence of issuer characteristics, security design 
features, the officially stated uses of proceeds and the aggregate conveliible debt volume 
on the abnormal announcement returns. First, we provide the test results obtained for our 
full  conveliible  debt  sample.  Afterwards,  we  report  split-sample  regression  results 
obtained  for  subsamples  of debt-like  versus  equity-like  convertibles  and  hot  market 
versus non-hot market conveliibles. 
5.1. Full-sample test results 
5.1.1. Influence of  issuer characteristics 
A.~easurement 
As  outlined in  Section 2,  the models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and 
Stein (1992) imply that the  convertible debt announcement effect should be  positively 
influenced  by  issuer-related  measures  for  the  level  of asset  substitution  costs,  risk 
uncertainty  costs  and  financial  distress  costs,  respectively.  In practice  however,  it  is 
nearly impossible to  find  separate proxy variables for  each of these debt-related costs. 
Instead,  we  will  test  Green's  (1984),  Brennan and  Kraus'  (1987)  and  Stein's  (1992) 
common prediction that the investor reactions should be favorably affected by the level of 
debt-related problems by means of the following general debt cost proxies: the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, the daily stock retum 
volatility and the ratio of eamings before interest and taxes (ebit) to total assets. Finns are 
23  A Tukey test of the pairwise differences  in the average abnOlmal  retUlTIS  realized across our different 
sample years and sample countries revealed no significant abnOlmal retUlTI differences. 16 
assumed  to  face  high  debt-related  costs  when  their  financial  leverage,  proportion  of 
intangibles and stock return volatility are high, and when their profitability is low. 
As discussed in Section 2, the model of Stein (1992) can be distinguished from the two 
other models by the  fact  that  it  considers  convetiible debt  an  instrument for  reducing 
equity-related adverse selection costs rather than an instrument for mitigating debt-related 
problems.  The  literature  proposes  several  proxy  variables  for  the  level  of adverse 
selection costs.  Following Lucas and McDonald (1990), these  costs will  be  higher for 
equity(  -linked) offerings announced after a large stock price runup, since investors could 
interpret such pre-announcement stock runup  as  a sign of firm overvaluation.  De  Jong 
and Veld (2001) argue that the problem of perceived overvaluation will also be worse for 
finns  with  sufficient  slack  capital,  because  slack  provides  an  alternative  source  for 
financing  new  projects.  In  turn,  Krasker  (1986)  shows  that  equity-related  adverse 
selection costs will be higher for security offerings with a larger issue size.24 Hence, we 
use the pre-announcement stock price runup (measured over the window (-75,-1) relative 
to the announcement date), the amount of slack capital (calculated as the sum of cash and 
marketable securities divided by total assets) and the relative issue size (calculated as the 
issue  size divided by the market value of equity)  as  measures  for  the level of equity-
related costs in our empirical tests.25 
We also include the following control variables that could act as  proxies for  both debt-
and equity-related costs. In order to account for the issuing firm's growth opportunities at 
the moment of the announcement, we use the market to book ratio (calculated as the sum 
of total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity divided by the book value of total assets) and the growth in total sales (calculated 
as total sales at fiscal year-end immediately after the issue date minus total sales at fiscal 
24 More specifically, Kl·asker (1986) extends the Myers and Majluf(1984) model by assuming that insiders 
can choose the  size of the  security  offering  (which is  equal to  the size of the  investment project).  He 
demonstrates that the stock price decline due to the new offering's mispricing will increase with the relative 
issue size. 
25  Of course,  strictly  spoken,  the relative issue  size  is  not a fiml-specific  variable.  However,  since the 
amount issued is assumed to be exogenous in our analysis, we consider the relative issue size variable more 
similar to the (equally exogenous) film characteristics than to the endogenously (i.e., by  the management) 
detelmined security design features. 17 
year-end immediately  pnor to  the  issue  date  divided  by total  sales  at  fiscal  year-end 
immediately  prior  to  the  issue  date).  While  the  market  to  book  ratio  measures  the 
profitability of the  firm's growth opportunities,  the  growth in  total  sales  measures  the 
actual  finn  growth  following  the  offering.26  According  to  Green  (1984),  these  two 
growth-related  variables  should  have  a  negative  influence  on  the  conveliible  debt 
announcement returns, since asset substitution problems will be less severe for finns with 
many profitable  investment opportunities.  By contrast,  Brennan and Kraus  (1987)  and 
Stein (1992) predict that the market to  book ratio and the growth in total  sales  should 
have a positive influence on the investor reactions, as both unceliainty about finn risk and 
uncertainty about film value should be  larger for high-growth firms.  In order to control 
for film size, we include the natural logarithm of total assets. Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
and Stein (1992) both imply that this variable should have a negative influence on the 
investor reactions, since uncertainty about finn risk, asymmetric infonnation about finn 
value and financial distress costs tend to be lower for larger companies. 
B. Results 
Table VI reports the parameter estimates of a regression with the day-O  abnonnal return 
as dependent variable and the firm-specific proxies discussed in the previous paragraph 
as  explanatory  variables.  Following  common  practice  in  the  convertible  debt-related 
literature,  the  abnonnal return regression is  estimated by means of the  weighted least 
squares (WLS) technique, with as weight for each observation the inverse of  the standard 
deviation of the  corresponding market model  residua1.27  The  last  column presents the 
expected signs of  the different finn-specific variables. 
«Ins  eli Table VI about here» 
26  Under rational expectations, such ex-post growth measure should be a good proxy for the firm growth 
that was anticipated at the moment of  the offering announcement (Pilotte, 1992). 
27 This holds for all of  the abnormal retUln regressions conducted throughout this study. Note that, while the 
number of offerings used for determining the sign and the size of the abnolnlal retUlnS  is equal to 256, the 
number of offerings used in the regression analyses is  substantially lower due to missing data fields  for 
fum-specific and security design variables. When we restrict the calculation of the abnOlmal announcement 
retUlnS  to  the  157  convertibles  on  which we  have  all  the  necessary  issuer- and  issue-related  data  for 
conducting the regression analyses, we obtain similar findings as  the ones reported in Table V for our full 
sample of 256 observations. 18 
In line with the predictions derived from Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992), we 
find  that  the  convertible  debt  announcement  returns  are  significantly  positively 
influenced  by  the  issuing  finn's  growth  opportunities,  and  significantly  negatively 
influenced by the finn size.  By contrast, all  of the  significant debt-related cost proxies 
(i.e.,  propOliion  of intangibles,  stock  return  volatility  and  profitability)  have  signs 
opposite from those predicted by the models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
and Stein (1992). This may be  attributable to the fact that the European conveliibles in 
our sample tend to have a very small conversion probability (cf. supra, Section 3), so that 
investors perceive these securities rather as straight debt issues than as hybrid instruments 
able  to  reduce  different debt-related  costs.  Despite  the  highly  debt-like  nature  of our 
sample  offerings  however,  we  see  that  the  pre-announcement  stock  price  runup  lS 
estimated  with  a  significantly  negative  regression  coefficient.  This  finding  does  not 
support the hypothesis derived from  Stein (1992).  On the whole, we  can thus conclude 
that  our  results  on the  impact  of the  issuer  characteristics  provide  only  very  limited 
evidence for the convertible debt models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and 
Stein (1992). In paragraph 5.2. infra, we will test the robustness of the findings repOlied 
here  by  splitting  up  our  sample  observations  according  to  the  size  of their  equity 
component and according  to  the  convertible  debt  market condition in which they  are 
issued. 
5.1.2. Influence of  security design characteristics 
In columns  (1)  to  (3)  of Table  VII,  we  report  the  parameter  estimates  of regression 
analyses with the day-O abnonnal return as dependent variable and the potential security-
related investor reaction determinants identified in  Section 2 as  explanatory variables. 
The expected signs of  these security design variables are listed in the last column. 
«Insert Table VII about here» 
Colmnn (1) of Table VII shows that the Eurobond dummy, the maturity, the conversion 
premium and the  post-conversion equity  dilution all  have  a  significant  impact  on the 
conveliible debt announcement returns with the  sign predicted by the models of Green 19 
(1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987). In column (2),  we add a  'soft versus hard call' 
dummy equal to  one  for  soft callable  convertibles  and  equal to  zero  for  hard callable 
convertibles (non-callable convertibles are not included in this regression).  We see that 
the  investor  reactions  associated with  soft  callable  convet1ible  debt  offerings  are  not 
significantly  more  favorable  than  the  investor  reactions  associated  with  hard  callable 
offerings,  which contrasts  with the  prediction derived from  Stein (1992).  Column (3) 
reveals that the length of the call protection period does not have a significant impact on 
the  announcement returns  either.  It should however be  noted that  this  last  regression 
could only be  estimated for  69  sample observations, i.e.  the convertibles for which we 
could retrieve the length of the call protection period from the KBC Financial Products 
Convertible Debt Database (Bloomberg does not contain information on this variable). 
5.1.3. Influence of  the stated uses of  proceeds 
As outlined in Section 2,  the  models of Green (1984)  and Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
imply that convertible debt offerings  intended to repay short tenn debt  should induce 
more positive investor reactions. Moreover, Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1984) and 
Stein (1992) yield the hypothesis that convertible debt offerings with less specific stated 
uses  of proceeds  should be  accompanied by more  favorable  announcement effects.  In 
order  to  identify  convertible  debt  issues  intended  to  pay  back  short  tenn  debt,  we 
constructed a  'Refinance ST Debt' dummy equal to  one for  offerings that mention the 
repayment of Sh0l1  tenn debt first  in their list of intended applications of the  offering 
proceeds, and equal to zero otherwise. In order to discern offerings with vague stated uses 
of proceeds  in  tum,  we  constructed  an  'Unspecified Use'  dummy  equal  to  one  for 
convertibles  that  mention  either  the  need  for  more  flexibility  or  'general  corporate 
purposes' in their stated use of proceeds, and equal to  zero otherwise. Subsequently, we 
perfonned t-tests  and  median  tests  on  the  differences  in  the  abnormal  returns  across 
subsamples with different values on these dummies?8 
28 The median test is especially powerful for distributions that are asymmetric and fat-tailed, which is often 
the case for daily stock retUlTI data like ours. 20 
«Ins  eli Table VIII about here» 
As can be  seen from the  first  row of Table  VIII,  the  t-test indicates  that convertibles 
primarily intended to pay back short term debt are accompanied by significantly more 
positive  investor  reactions.  This  result  suppotis  the  rationales  of Green  (1984)  and 
Brennan and  Kraus  (1987),  and  is  consistent  with  our earlier  finding  of a  favorable 
influence  of the  convertible  debt  maturity  on  the  announcement  retums.  However,  it 
should be noted that the median test statistic does not confinn the significant influence of 
the  'Refinance  ST  Debt'  dmmny.  Moreover,  when  we  define  this  dummy  in  an 
altemative way (e.g., =  1 for  offerings that mention the refinancing of shoti tenn debt 
somewhere in their list of intended uses of proceeds, and = 0 otherwise), even the t-test 
statistic has an insignificant value. The second row of Table VIII shows that, in contrast 
with the  prediction derived from  Green (1984),  Brennan and Kraus  (1987)  and Stein 
(1992), convertible debt offerings with more vague stated uses of  proceeds are associated 
with significantly more negative announcement retums. However, this result is again not 
confirmed  by  the  median  test,  and  is  not  robust  to  altemative  specifications  of the 
'Unspecified  Use'  dummy.  We  also  created  dummies  for  the  other  stated  uses  of 
proceeds  mentioned  in  Table  III  supra,  as  well  as  for  the  aggregate  stated  uses  of 
proceeds - categories 'New financing',  'Refinance existing debt'  and 'Other purposes'. 
Since none of these dummies has a significant influence on the investor reactions,29 we 
can conclude that the  officially stated uses of proceeds have a very limited power for 
explaining the announcement retums. This may be attributable to the fact that over 60% 
of the issuing firms cite more than one possible application of the issue proceeds, so that 
it is  nearly  impossible  to  disentangle  the  influences  of separate  intended uses  on the 
announcement returns. Following Akhigbe et al.  (1997), it could also be that the market 
interprets  the  stated uses  of proceeds  as  irrelevant  information,  since  these  officially 
stated purposes often diverge from the actual intentions of  the issuing finn. 
29  For parsimony,  we  don't repOlt  our  univariate  test  results  with respect  to  these  other stated use  of 
proceeds dummies here. These results are available upon request. 21 
5.1.4. Influence of  the convertible debt market condition 
Table  IX presents  the  t-test  and  median test  statistics  for  the  difference  in  the  day-O 
abnonnal  retums  across  convertibles  issued  during  'hot'  and  'non-hot'  issue  markets 
(identified according to the criterion outlined in paragraph 3.2.4. supra). In contrast with 
the prediction derived from the models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and 
Stein (1992), we see that the abnonnal stock price reaction recorded for the hot window 
convel1ibles  is  significantly  more  negative  than  the  abnormal  stock  price  reaction 
recorded for  the  non-hot  window convel1ibles.  In the  next paragraph,  we  will  further 
examine the robustness of  this finding. 
«Insert Table IX about here» 
5.1.5.  Joint  analysis  of the  influence  of issuer  characteristics,  security  design 
characteristics and the convertible debt market condition 
In order to  examine whether the  combination of issuer  characteristics,  security design 
features  and  the  aggregate  convertible  debt  issue  volume  would  change  any  of the 
findings reported in the previous paragraphs, we estimated an abnormal retum regression 
that jointly includes  these  three  explanatory variable  categories.  Table  X  presents the 
parameter estimates of  this regression analysis.3o 
«Include Table X about here» 
We  see  that  our  findings  regarding  the  influence  of the  finn  characteristics  on  the 
announcement retums  are  vil1ually  unaffected by  the  inclusion of security design and 
market condition variables.  By contrast, the parameter estimates of the  security design 
features tend to  become less significant after we control for  firm-specific variables and 
for the aggregate convertible debt issue volume. This could be attributable to the fact that 
companies of a cel1ain  type  (e.g.  low risk firms)  cluster into  issuing  convel1ibles of a 
30  Due to the limited availability and the poor statistical significance of the length of the  call protection 
period  and  the  stated use  of proceeds  dummies,  we  did  not  include  these  variables  in  the  combined 
regression analysis. 22 
certain type (e.g. Eurobonds), so that the security-related variables merely act as  proxies 
for firm characteristics. In order to examine this possibility, we regressed the five security 
design features listed in Table X on the firm-specific variables represented in this table. 
We briefly report the main conclusions that can be drawn from these regression analyses 
here.3l  First,  the  logistic  regression  with the  Eurobond dummy  as  dependent  variable 
indicates that firm size has a highly significant positive impact on the  probability that a 
conveliible will be issued on the Eurobond market. By contrast, finn risk measures have 
no significant influence on this probability. The Eurobond dummy thus seems to act as a 
proxy for the  size of the issuing company rather than as  an inverse proxy for  film  risk 
(i.e., our original hypothesis based on Kim and Stulz (1992)). Nevertheless, our finding 
of a negative impact of this security feature on the  announcement returns still suppOlis 
the  models  of Brennan and Kraus  (1987)  and  Stein (1992),  since  these  models  both 
predict  a  negative  impact of the  firm  size  on the  investor  reactions.  It is  also  wOlih 
mentioning  that  the  regressions  with  the  conversion  premium  and  the  level  of post-
conversion equity dilution as  dependent variables show that the  former  security design 
characteristic  is  significantly  positively  influenced by  the  ratio  of ebit to  total  assets, 
whereas the latter security design characteristic is  significantly negatively influenced by 
this profitability measure. Since the ebit to total assets ratio could act as a proxy for firm 
quality, these findings provide evidence for Brennan and Kraus' (1987) conjecture that a 
high conversion premium indicates a high-quality finn type,  and a high level of post-
conversion equity dilution indicates a low-quality firm type (cf. supra, Section 2). Lastly, 
the regression analysis with the maturity as  dependent variable reveals that none of the 
issuer  characteristics  has  a  significant  influence  on  this  security  design  feature.  The 
significant regression coefficient of the maturity registered in Table X thus indicates that 
investors use this security design characteristic as  an extra source of information above 
the  infonnation derived from firm-related accounting and stock price  data, which is  in 
line with the predictions derived from Green (1984) and Brennan and Kraus (1987). 
Table X also shows that our finding of a significantly negative influence of the aggregate 
convertible debt volume on the announcement returns is  robust to the inclusion of firm 
31  Our detailed regression results are available upon request. 23 
and security  design  characteristics.  Hence,  this  result  can not  merely  be  attributed  to 
particular firm and/or security types clustering during pat1icular market conditions. As an 
additional, more direct test for possible interactions between the conve11ible debt market 
condition and the conve11ible debt security design, we also perfonned a contingency table 
analysis of the association between a 'debt-like/equity-like' dummy and a 'hot/non-hot' 
dummy.  Convertibles with a risk-neutral  conversion probability lower than the  sample 
average  of 32.44%  are  labeled  'debt-like',  whereas  conve11ibles  with  a  risk-neutral 
conversion probability higher than or equal to this value are labeled 'equity-like'  .32 The 
hot  convertible  debt  offerings  are  identified  according  to  the  criterion  outlined  in 
paragraph 3.2.4. supra. 
«Insert Table XI about here» 
Table  XI reveals  that there  is  a  highly  significant (at less  than  I %) interaction effect 
between the  degree  of equity-likeness of the  convertibles  and the  market condition in 
which these hybrid instruments are issued. More specifically, 74.47% of the hot market 
offerings  have  a  debt-like  security  design.  Conversely,  73.33%  of the  equity-like 
offerings are issued during non-hot issue windows. In the light of this result, our finding 
of a  significantly  negative  impact  of the  conve11ible  debt  market  condition  on  the 
announcement returns becomes even more remat'kable, since, based on the pecking order 
model of Myers and Majluf (1984), we would expect a more favorable investor reaction 
to  relatively  more  debt-like  convertibles.33  We  could  thus  conclude  that  we  find  a 
negative influence of the convertible debt market condition despite the differences in the 
conve11ible  debt  security  design  across  hot  and  non-hot  markets.  Since  we  already 
32 The risk-neutral probability is  calculated following  equation (1) in paragraph 3.2.2. supra.  We use this 
variable because it is a more comprehensive measure for the degree of equity-likeness of a convertible than 
features such as the maturity and the conversion premium, which capture only one aspect of the convertible 
debt security design. 
33  Since  the  rationales  of Green  (1984),  Brennan  and  Kraus  (1987)  and  Stein  (1992)  yield  no  direct 
prediction on the influence of  the risk-neutral conversion probability on the convertible debt announcement 
retums, we did not discuss the impact of  this security design variable in paragraph 5.1.2. Nevetiheless, it is 
worth  mentioning  that  the  risk-neutral  conversion  probability  has  an  insignificant  influence  on  the 
announcement retums  when it is  considered  separately,  but  a  significantly  negative  impact when  it  is 
included with finn-specific variables and with the aggregate convertible debt volume in a WLS regression 
with the day-O abnormal retum as dependent variable. 24 
showed that  the  negative  impact  of the  convetiible  debt  market condition  cannot  be 
attributed  to  differences  in  the  issuer  characteristics  across  hot  and  non-hot  issue 
windows  either  (cf.  supra,  Table  X),  there  should  be  another  explanation  for  this 
surprising result.  We  suggest two  alternative  interpretations.  First, it  could be  that the 
aggregate convetiible debt volume acts as an inverse proxy for the economy-wide level of 
debt- and/or equity-related costs (Le., the opposite from the hypothesis that we originally 
derived from the models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992)). 
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that there is a positive correlation of +0.48 
between a three-month moving average of the number of convertible debt issues and the 
number of straight debt issues, and a positive con'elation of +0.35 between a three-month 
moving average of  the number of convertible debt issues and the number of equity issues 
made  by  Western  European  companies  over  our  sample  period.34  However,  if 
convertibles are  effectively more appropriate for  firms  facing  severe  debt- and equity-
related  costs  (as  argued  by  the  above-cited  models),  it  is  rather  strange  that  these 
securities would cluster during periods when these costs are low (and hence, the investor 
reactions  to  their  announcements  are  more  negative).  An alternative,  more  plausible 
explanation for  our finding  of a  negative  influence  of the  aggregate  convertible  debt 
volume on the announcement returns is that stockholders suspect hot market offerings to 
be driven by opportunistic issuer motives (e.g taking advantage of a temporary equity 
overvaluation) or by irrational market fads, rather than by the wish to reduce debt- and/or 
equity-related costS.35  As a  consequence,  these  hot window convertibles  are  punished 
with more negative investor reactions than otherwise similar non-hot window issues. 
On  the  whole,  our  full-sample  regresslOn  results  indicate  that  the  inclusion  of the 
convertible debt security design and the convertible debt market condition enhances our 
understanding of the convertible debt announcement effect. This can also be seen from 
the  adjusted R2  of the  abnormal  return  regression,  which increases  from  29.80%  (cf. 
34 The lists of Westem European straight debt and equity issues were both retrieved from Bloomberg. 
35  Fads can be described as  'drastic and seemingly whimsical swings  in mass  behavior without obvious 
extemal stimulus' (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsh, 1992). 25 
supra, Table VI) to  36.75% (cf.  supra,  Table X)  when security- and market condition-
related explanatory variables are added to the firm-specific explanatory variables.36 
5.2. Split-sample test results 
5.2.1.  'Debt-like' versus  'equity-like' convertibles 
In paragraph 5.1.  supra, we  showed that the regression parameters of the  finn-specific 
variables are highly similar to  the  regression parameters that would be expected in the 
case of straight debt offering announcements, and suggested that this  finding  might be 
attributable to the highly 'debt-like' nature of European convertible debt issues. If this is 
actually the case, we should observe more evidence for the convertible debt rationales of 
Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992) for those convertibles in our 
sample that have a relatively larger equity component. In order to test this conjecture, we 
again subdivided our sample issues into a debt-like and an equity-like subsample on the 
basis  of their  risk-neutral  probability  of conversion,  with  the  average  risk-neutral 
probability value  of 32.44%  as  benchmark.  Subsequently,  we  performed  split-sample 
regression analyses with the day-O  abnonnal return as  dependent variable and the firm-
and  market  condition-related  proxies  enumerated  in  Table  X  supra  as  explanatory 
variables. The results of  this split-sample regression analysis are reported in Table XII. 
«Inseli Table XII about here» 
Table XII reveals that especially the  coefficients of the  equity-related cost proxies  are 
substantially  different  between  the  debt- and  the  equity-like  convertibles.  More 
specifically, while the pre-announcement stock price runup has a significantly negative 
influence on the  investor reactions for the  debt-like conveliibles, it has an  insignificant 
impact on the  investor reactions for the  equity-like conveliibles. In addition, while  the 
36  Since  most  other  convertible  debt-related  event  studies  repOlt  adjusted  R2,s  lower  than  10%,  the 
explanatory power of our abnormal retum regressions is  exceptionally high. This might be attributable to 
the  fact  that  the  announcement  dates  used  in  our  study  are  retrieved  from  an  electronic  database 
(Bloomberg),  which  makes  them  more  accurate  than  the  announcement  dates  based  on  published 
newspaper altic1es that are used in most other studies. 26 
amount of slack capital has an insignificant parameter estimate for the debt-like offerings, 
it has  significantly positive parameter estimate  for  the  equity-like offerings.  When we 
look  at  the  debt-related  cost  proxies  in  tum,  we  see  that  the  leverage  ratio  has  an 
insignificant  influence  on the  announcement retums  for  the  debt-like  offerings,  but  a 
highly significant positive influence for the equity-like offerings. Our results thus suggest 
that investors react more positively to equity-like convertibles issued by firms with high 
equity-related adverse selection costs and a high debt ratio, which provides evidence for 
the validity of the Stein (1992) model for this convertible debt category. By contrast, the 
regression estimates registered for the relatively more debt-like conveliibles illustrate that 
investors do  not consider these  securities able  to  reduce adverse  selection or financial 
distress costs. Hence, we obtain formal  evidence for our conjecture that the  'backdoor-
equity'  model  of Stein  (1992)  only  holds  for  convertibles  with  a  sufficiently  high 
probability  of  conversion.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  substantial  differences  in  the 
parameter  estimates  obtained  for  the  debt-like  and  the  equity-like  conveliibles,  the 
regression coefficients of  the propOliion of  intangible assets and the stock retum volatility 
are  significantly  negative  for  the  equity-like  convertibles  just  as  for  the  debt-like 
convertibles.  Probably,  the  adverse  impact  of these  debt-related  cost  proxies  can  be 
ascribed to  the  fact  that even our  'equity-like'  sample  offerings tend to  have  a rather 
small equity component,37 so that investors are still highly concemed about the potential 
asset substitution and risk unceliainty costs associated with these securities. 
5.2.2.  'Hot market' versus 'non-hot market' convertibles 
If the  temporal  fluctuations  in  the  aggregate  conveliible  debt  issue  volume  capture 
changes in the amount of debt- and equity-related costs over time (as argued by Bayless 
and Chaplinsky (1996) and Lewis et  al.  (2003)),  we  should observe differences in the 
regression coefficients of finn- and security-specific debt- and equity-related cost proxies 
across  hot  and  non-hot  market  offerings.  In  order  to  examine  this  conjecture,  we 
estimated the regression reported in Table X separately for hot and non-hot conveliible 
debt offerings,  with the  hot offerings  identified  according  to  the  criterion outlined in 
37  As  mentioned  before,  the  average  risk-neutral  conversion  probability  (i.e.,  the  cut-off  value  for 
classifying a convettible as  'equity-like') is only 32.44%. 27 
paragraph 3.2.4. supra. The results of this split-sample regression analysis are reported in 
Table XIII. 
«Inseli Table XIII about here» 
Table XIII shows that the adjusted R2  of the hot market regression (i.e. 20.18%) is much 
lower than the adjusted R2 of  the non-hot market regression (i.e. 65.62%).38 According to 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), who obtain an analogous result in the context of equity 
offerings, this finding may be interpreted in two ways. On one hand, it could indicate that 
the level of infonnation asymmetry for the economy as a whole is lower during hot issue 
markets, so that the stockholders don't need to rely on variables proxying different issuer 
and security design characteristics during such windows (since they know the true quality 
of the issuing firms).  On the other hand, it could indicate that the stockholders resOli to 
herding  behavior during  hot issue  markets,  to  the  extent that they  suspend individual 
assessments  of firm  value  (based  on  different  proxy  variables  for  issuer  and  issue 
characteristics)  in  favor  of a  collective  (negative)  assessment  of all  conveliible  debt 
offering  announcements  made  during  such periods?9 When we  look  at  the  individual 
regression coefficients in turn, we see that the pre-announcement stock price runup and 
the amount of slack capital have a significantly negative influence for convertibles issued 
during hot markets, but an insignificant influence for conveliibles issued during non-hot 
markets.  The  market to  book ratio  on the  other  hand is  significantly  positive  for  hot 
market  offerings,  but  insignificant  for  non-hot  market  offerings.  Since  the  pre-
announcement stock price runup and the amount of slack capital could act as proxies for 
38 When we repeated the regression represented in Table XIII with only firm-specific variables on the right-
hand side, we obtained adjusted R2,s of 12.67% for the hot market subsample and 61.22% for the non-hot 
market  subsample.  When  we  conducted the  split-sample  regression  analysis  with  only  security-related 
variables on the right-hand side in turn, we obtained adjusted R2,s of 8.99% for the hot market subsample 
and 19.56% for the non-hot market subsample. We can thus conclude that the lower explanatory power of 
the abnonnal return regression during hot issue windows is  caused by a lower significance of both firm-
specific and security design characteristics. 
39  Bikhchandani et al.  (1992) provide the  following  description  for  the  herding  behavior of individuals 
during  'informational cascades'  (i.e.,  a  more  general  tenn for  market fads):  'An infOlmational  cascade 
occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of  those ahead of  him, to follow the 
behavior  of the  preceding  individual without  regard to his  own  infOlmation.'  This  could  explain why 
stockholders react negatively upon any convertible announced during hot market windows, irrespective of 
its security design and of the characteristics of the issuing fum. 28 
finn overvaluation (de Jong and Veld, 2001) and the market to book ratio could act as  a 
proxy  for  the  firm's  true  need  for  financing,  these  findings  might  indicate  investor 
concern about opportunistic issuer motives behind hot window offerings. 
5.3. Robustness checks 
In order to check the validity of our findings on the detenninants of the convertible debt 
announcement returns, we performed several robustness checks. For parsimony, we only 
briefly report the outcomes of  these tests here:40 
Our findings  are not biased due  to  outliers,  since they remain virtually unaffected 
when we remove the influential observations (identified through the 'dfbeta', 'dffits' 
and 'Cook's distance'  criteria) from  our sample.  Our results also remain unaltered 
when we winsorize our data at  1  %, thus excluding the lowest and highest percentile 
of  each variable. 
Our results  are  not biased by multicollinearity or heteroscedasticity problems.  Of 
course, the latter conclusion is not surprising, since we use the weighted least squares 
technique for estimating our regressions. 
Our results remain qualitatively the  same when we remove the most thinly traded 
stocks  (identified  according  to  the  criterion  outlined  in paragraph  4.3.)  from  our 
sample. 
Our findings regarding the  impact of finn-specific debt- and equity-related costs on 
the announcement returns are insensitive to the proxy variables used for measuring 
these costs (e.g. beta instead of stock return volatility as a measure of  finn risk). 
Our findings  obtained by means of split-sample  regressions  for  equity-like  versus 
debt-like and hot versus non-hot convertible debt offerings are robust to the specific 
criterion used for partitioning our sample observations (e.g. the median risk-neutral 
conversion probability  instead  of the  average  risk-neutral  conversion probability; 
40 A more elaborate description of our different robustness checks is available upon request. 29 
nominal  convertible  debt  Issue  volumes  instead  of real  convertible  debt  Issue 
volumes, etc.). 
According  to  Abhyankar  and  Dunning  (1999),  it  might  be  better  to  study  the 
conveitible debt announcement effect over the event window (0,1) instead of over the 
announcement date  only,  in order to  account for  stock price transactions  occurring 
after the stock market closure on the announcement date. However, when we use the 
abnonnal returns realized over this two-day event window as dependent variable, our 
abnOlmal  return regression results  become  statistically  less  significant.  This  might 
indicate that the announcements of our sample offerings were made early during the 
trading day, so that the stockholders' reaction to these announcements occurred on the 
actual announcement date. 
6. Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  stockholder  reactions  to  conveitible  debt  offering 
announcements made by Western European companies. In line with previous studies, we 
find  that these  announcements  are  accompanied by  a  significantly  negative  abnormal 
stock return in the order of -1.32%. Subsequently, we test the ability of the convertible 
debt models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992) to explain the 
cross-sectional  variation  in  the  conveitible  debt  announcement  effect.  While  prior 
empirical  work  focuses  on  finn-specific  abnormal  return  determinants,  our  study 
simultaneously examines the influence of the security design, the officially stated uses of 
the offering proceeds and the aggregate convertible debt issue volume on the stockholder 
reactions.  In this way, we obtain new insights  on the variables  driving  the  convertible 
debt announcement effect. 
With respect to  the convertible debt security design, we  find that the maturity and the 
conversion premium have a positive influence on the stockholder reactions, whereas the 
Eurobond  feature  and  the  level  of post-conversion  equity  dilution  have  a  negative 
influence. These findings  all support the predictions derived from the models of Green 30 
(1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992).  We also  discover that hot market 
convertibles  induce  more  negative  announcement  effects  than  non-hot  market 
conveliibles. This finding may reflect investors'  suspicion that hot market conveliibles 
are inspired by oppOliunistic or ilTational issuer motives rather than by the wish to reduce 
debt- and/or equity-related costs. In addition, we document significant interaction effects 
between the issuer characteristics, the convertible debt security design and the conveliible 
debt market condition. First, we show that the influence of the  issuer characteristics on 
the  announcement retUlTIS  depends on the  degree  of equity-likeness of the  conveliible 
debt: convertibles with an 'equity-like' security design are perceived as instruments able 
to reduce adverse selection and financial distress costs, whereas convertibles with a 'debt-
like' security design are perceived as predominantly straight debt. We  also find that the 
influence  of the  issuer  characteristics  depends  on  the  market  condition  in  which  the 
conveliibles  are  issued:  during  hot markets,  stockholders  react  much more  negatively 
upon variables proxying finn overvaluation than during non-hot markets.  Fmihennore, 
we demonstrate that the conveliible debt issuer and security design characteristics have a 
lot more power for  explaining the  stockholder reactions during non-hot windows than 
during  hot  windows.  This  result  might  indicate  that  stockholders  resort  to  irrational 
herding behavior during hot issue periods (i.e., the  'infonnation cascade' herding theory 
of Bikhchandani  et  al.  (1992)).  Lastly,  we  find  that there  is  a  significant  association 
between the  convertible debt security design and the conveliible debt market condition. 
More particularly,  the  large  majority of the  equity-like  convertibles  are  issued during 
non-hot markets (or, conversely, the large majority of the hot market conveliibles have a 
debt-like security design). Together, these interaction effects suggest that conveliible debt 
offerings  can  broadly  be  subdivided  into  two  categories.  A  first  category  consists  of 
conveliibles  issued  by  finns  that would otherwise  have  issued equity,  but resort to  a 
conveliible debt offering in order to mitigate equity-related adverse selection costs (i.e., 
the rationale of Stein (1992)). These offerings have an equity-like security design, and are 
mainly offered during non-hot issue  windows.  A second group consists of convertibles 
issued by firms that would otherwise have issue straight debt, but resOli to a convertible 
debt offering in order to take advantage of a temporary equity overvaluation or in order to 
be pati of a convertible debt hype. These conveliibles are offered during hot markets, and 31 
tend to have a debt-like security design. This interpretation is consistent with our finding 
that hot market convertibles induce more negative announcement returns than non-hot 
market convertibles. Additional research should fmiher examine its validity, for instance 
through a logistic regression analysis that compares the variables driving the decision to 
issue  convertible  debt  to  the variables  driving  the  decision to  issue  straight debt and 
equity. 
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Geographical Distribution of a Sample of 256 Convertible Debt Offerings made by Western 
European Companies over the Period 1990-2002 
33 
Number of offerings  Percentage of  total 
Country of domicile of issuing fim1 
France  98  38.28% 
United Kingdom  37  14.45% 
The Netherlands  32  12.50% 
Switzerland  20  7.81% 
Germany  18  7.03% 
Sweden  12  4.69% 
Norway  9  3.52% 
Finland  7  2.73% 
Italy  7  2.73% 
Austria  4  1.50% 
Belgium  4  1.56% 
Spain  4  1.56% 
Denmark  3  1.17% 
Greece  1  0.39% 
Total  256  100% 34 
Table II 
Descriptive Firm and Security Characteristics of a Sample of 256 Convertible Debt Offerings made 
by Western European Companies over the Period 1990-2002 
All accounting variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. Total 
assets are expressed in constant 2002 dollars. Debt ratio is  total debt divided by total assets.  Market to book ratio is  (total 
assets + market value of common equity  measured one  week prior to  the  announcement date  - book  value of common 
equity)/total assets.  Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. Profitability denotes the 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation of the continuously 
compounded daily stock return estimated over the window (-240,-40) relative to the announcement date.  Issue size denotes 
the offering proceeds expressed in constant 2002 dollars. Issue size/market value of equity is  the issue size divided by the 
market value of common equity measured one week prior to the announcement date.  Post-conversion equity dilution is the 
number of shares issued assuming full conversion of the convertibles divided by (1) the total number of shares outstanding at 
fiscal  year-end before the offering announcement and (2) the number of shares issued assuming full  conversion.  Maturity 
denotes the initial maturity of the offering. Conversion premium is the conversion price divided by the stock price measured 
one  week  prior  to  the  announcement  date.  Proportion  of privately  placed  offerings  denotes  the  percentage  of sample 
observations of which at least one tranche is privately placed. All other variables are self-descriptive. 
Descriptive measure  Mean 
Firm characteristics 
(1)  Total assets ($ mio) 
(2)  Debt ratio 
(3)  Market to book ratio 
(4)  Slack 
(5)  Profitability 
(6)  Stock return volatility 
Security characteristics 
(7)  Issue size ($ mio) 
(8)  Issue size/market value of  equity 
(9)  Post-conversion equity dilution 
(10) Coupon 
(11) Maturity (years) 
(12) Conversion premium 
(13) Length of  call protection period (years) 
(14) Proportion of soft callable offerings 
(15) Proportion of  hard callable offerings 
(16) PropOltion of  Eurobonds 

































Overview of Officially Stated Purposes of [ssue for Convertible Debt Offerings made by Western 
European Companies over the Period 1990-2002 
The sample consists of a subset of 105 convettible debt offerings for which the offering prospectus could be retrieved from 
the KBC Financial Products Convettible Debt Database. Column (1) provides the number (and percentage) of offerings for 
which the intended use of proceeds is listed.first in the 'Use ofproceeds'-section of the offering prospectus. Column (2) lists 
the number (and percentage) of offerings for which the intended use of proceeds is  mentioned somewhere in the  'Use of 
proceeds'  -section of  the offering prospectus. 
Stated purpose of issue 
New.financing 
(1)  Intemal growth (capital expenditure, 
R&D, innovation) 
(2)  Extemal growth 
(3)  Growth (not futther specified) 
(4)  Working capital 
Re.finance existing debt 
(5)  Refmance bank debt 
(6)  Refmance shOtt term debt 
(7)  Refmance debt (not futther specified) 
(8)  Optimize fmancial structme 
Other purposes 
(9)  Avoid liquidity crisis 
(10) Take advantage of favorable interest 
rates 
(11) Prevent excessive equity dilution 
(12) Enhance flexibility 




21  (20.00%) 
6 (5.71%) 
1 (0.95%) 
51  (48.57%) 
6 (5.71%) 

























23 (5.25%) 36 
Table IV 
Calendar Time Intervals Classified as  Hot Issue Windows 
Hot issue windows are at least three contiguous months where the aggregate real convertible debt issue volume exceeds the 
upper quartile of a three-month moving average of aggregate real conveltible debt issue volume. Real issue volume is the 
aggregate  Westem European  conveltible  debt  issue  volume  raised over the  calendar time  interval  specified in the  first 
column, convelted into constant 2002 dollars by means of the European Consumer Price Index. The percentages represented 
in the second and the third column are expressed relative to the total number of sample months (i.e.  156) and the total real 
conveltible debt volume raised over the sample period (i.e. $103.86 billion), respectively. 
Hot issue windows  Duration (in months) 
March 1995 - May 1995 
May 1998 - July 1998 
Nov. 1998 - Feb. 1999 
Sept. 1999- Nov. 1999 
Feb. 2000 - July 2000 
Oct. 2000 - Dec. 2000 
April 2001 - July 2001 











Real issue volume 









61,742.59 (59.45%) 37 
Table V 
Daily Abnormal Stock Returns around Convertible Debt Offering Announcements 
The  sample  includes  256  convertible  debt  offerings  made  by  Western  European  companies  between  1990  and  2002. 
AbnOlmal retums are calculated by  means of the market model, with the market index proxied by the Datastream country 
benchmark index for the issuing film's country of domicile. The market model regressions are estimated over the windows 
(-200,-61) and (61,200) relative to the announcement dates retrieved from Bloomberg. All equity retums are continuously 
compounded and based on stock prices expressed in the local cunency of  the issuing film's country of domicile. 
Interval in relation 
to annOlmcement 




Z-statistic  Percentage  Sign test statistic 
negative 
atmouncement 
(%)  retums 
(%) 
1. Pre-announcement period window 
(-60,-2)  4.06 (3.73)  3.04'"  40.63  24'" 
2. Almouncement period windows 
(-1,0)  -1.20 (-0.96)  -4.25***  63.67  -35'" 
0  -1.32 (-0.95)  -7.56***  66.80  -43*** 
(0,1)  -1.44(-1.11)  -5.48***  64.06  -36*** 
(-1,1)  -1.32 (-1.01)  -3.58**'  60.94  -28**' 
3. Post-announcement period window 
(2,60)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.32  50.78  -2 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level 











Parameter Estimates of a Regression of the Abnormal Stock Returns Realized at Convertible Debt 
Offering Announcements on Firm-Specific Variables 
The dependent variable is  the abnOlmal stock retum realized on the conveltible debt announcement date. All independent 
variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. Debt ratio is total debt 
divided by total assets. PropOltion of intangibles is intangible assets divided by total assets. Stock retum volatility denotes the 
standard deviation of the daily  stock retums  estimated over the  window (-240,  -40)  relative to  the  announcement  date. 
Profitability is  eamings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  Stock price lUnup  is the cumulative stock retum 
realized over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities 
divided by total assets.  Issue size/market value of equity is  the issue size divided by the market value of common equity 
measured one week prior to the mmouncement date. Market to book ratio is (total assets + market value of common equity 
measured one week prior to the announcement date - book value of common equity)/total assets.  Growth in total sales is 
(total sales at fiscal year-end immediately after the issue date - total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue 
date)/total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue date. Fim1 size is the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
regression  is  estimated using  weighted  least  squares,  where  the  weight  is  the  standard deviation  of the  market  model 
residuals. 'G', 'B&K' and'S' denote the models of  Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Stein (1992), respectively. 
Independent variable  Parameter estimate  Expected sign (model) 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  0.071** 
Firm-specific proxies (or debt-related costs 
Debt ratio 
PropOltion of  intangibles 
Stock retum volatility 
Profitability 
Firm-specific proxies for equitv-related costs 
Stock price lUnup 
Slack 
Issue size/market value of equity 
Firm-specific control variables 
Market to book ratio 







Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
























+(G, B&K, S) 
+ (G, B&K, S) 
+(G,B&K, S) 




- (G)/+ (B&K, S) 
- (G)/+ (B&K, S) 
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Table VII 
Parameter Estimates of a Regression of the Abnormal Stock Returns Realized at Convertible Debt 
Offering Announcements on Security Design Variables 
The dependent variable is the abnonnal stock retutn realized on the convertible debt announcement date. Eurobond dummy is 
equal to  one  for Eurobond offerings, and equal to  zero  for  non-Eurobond (i.e.,  domestic  or foreign)  offerings.  Maturity 
denotes the initial maturity of the offering. Conversion premium is  the conversion price divided by the stock price measured 
one week prior to the  announcement date.  Post-conversion equity  dilution  is  the number of shares  issued assuming full 
conversion of the convertibles divided by (1) the total number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end before the offering 
announcement and (2) the number of shares issued assuming full conversion. Soft versus hard call dummy is equal to one for 
soft  callable  convertibles,  and  equal  to  zero  for  hard  callable  conveltibles.  The  length  of the  call  protection  period  is 
measured relative to the offering's initial maturity. Regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the weight 
is the standard deviation of the market model residuals. 'G', 'B&K' and'S' denote the models of Green (1984), Brennan and 






Post-conversion equity dilution 
Soft versus hard call dUlmny 






Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.01 level 
(1) 
-0.050**' 
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Table Vlll 
Univariate Analysis of [nfluence of Officially Stated Purposes of [ssue on the Abnormal Stock 
Returns Realized at Convertible Debt Offering Announcements 
The sample consists of a subset of 105 conveltible debt offerings for which the offering prospectus could be retrieved from 
the KBC Financial Products Conveltible Debt Database. The dependent variable is the abnOln1al stock retu111  realized on the 
conveltible debt announcement date. 'Refinance ST Debt' dummy is equal to one for offerings that mention the repayment of 
shOlt teln1 debt first in the list of intended applications of  the offering proceeds. 'Unspecified Use' dummy is equal to one for 
offerings that mention the need for more flexibility or 'general corporate purposes' in the list of intended applications of the 
offering proceeds. NJ  and No  denote the number of observations in the subsamples with values 1 and 0 for the stated use of 
proceeds dummies, respectively. N  =  NJ  + No.  AARJ  and AARa denote the average day-O  abnOln1al  retu111s  realized in the 
subsamples with values 1 and 0 for the stated use of proceeds durnn1ies, respectively. The differences between the AAR1's 
and AARa's are insetted in parentheses. 'G', 'B&K' and'S' denote the models of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
and Stein (1992), respectively. 














Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 




AARJ =  -0.010 
AARa =  -0.023 
(0.013) 
AARI =  -0.031 
AARa =  -0.017 
(-0.014) 
t-test statistic  Median test 
statistic 
1.80*  1.21 
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Table lX 
Univariate Analysis of lnfluence of the Convertible Debt Market Condition on the Abnormal Stock 
Returns Realized at Convertible Debt Offering Announcements 
Hot issue dummy is  equal to one for convertibles issued during hot markets, i.e. at least three contiguous months where the 
aggregate real convertible debt issue volume exceeds the upper quartile of a three-month moving average of aggregate real 
conveliible debt issue volume. NJ  and No denote the number of observations in the subsamples with values 1 and 0 for the hot 
issue  dummy,  respectively.  N  =  NJ  + No.  AARI  and  AARo  denote  the  average  day-O  abnOlmal  returns  realized  in  the 
subsamples with values 1 and 0 for the hot issue dummy, respectively. The difference between AARJ and AARo is inserted in 








NJ  =  110 
No =146 
N=256 
Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.01 level 
Average day-O 
abnOlmal returns 
(  difference) 
AARJ =  -0.019 
AARo =  -0.009 
(-0.009) 
t-test statistic  Median test 
statistic 
-2.16**  -3.02*** 
Expected sign 
(model) 
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Table X 
Parameter Estimates of a Regression of the Abnormal Stock Returns Realized at Convertible Debt 
Offering Announcements on Firm-Specific, Security Design and Convertible Debt Market Condition 
Variables 
The dependent variable is the abnormal stock return realized on the convertible debt aIlliOUncement  date. All film-specific 
independent variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to the aIlliouncement date, unless othelwise indicated. Debt ratio 
is  total  debt  divided  by  total  assets.  Proportion  of intangibles  is  intangible  assets  divided  by  total  assets.  Stock return 
volatility  denotes the  standard deviation of the  daily  stock returns  estimated over the window (-240, -40) relative to  the 
announcement date.  Profitability  is  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes  divided  by  total  assets.  Stock  price  runup  is  the 
cumulative stock return realized over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. Slack denotes the sum of cash 
and marketable securities divided by total assets. Issue size/market value of equity is  the issue size divided by  the market 
value of common equity measured one week prior to the announcement date. Market to book ratio is (total assets + market 
value of common equity measured one week prior to the announcement date - the book value of common equity)/total assets. 
Growth  in  total  sales  is  (total  sales  at  fiscal  year-end  immediately  after  the  issue  date  - total  sales  at  fiscal  year-end 
inmlediately prior to the issue date) /total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue date. Film size is the natural 
10gaI·ithm of total assets. Eurobond dummy is equal to one for Eurobond offerings, and equal to zero for non-Eurobond (i.e., 
domestic or foreign) offerings. Maturity denotes the initial maturity of the offering. Conversion premium is the conversion 
price divided by the stock price measured one week prior to the aIlliOlmCement date.  Post-conversion equity dilution is  the 
number of shares issued assuming full conversion of  the conveltibles divided by (1) the total number of shares outstanding at 
fiscal year-end before the offering announcement and (2) the number of shares issued assuming full  conversion. Aggregate 
conveltible debt volume is  a three-month moving average of real convertible debt issue volume, centered round the  issue 
month. The regression is  estimated using weighted least squares, where the weight is  the standard deviation of the market 






PropOltion of intangibles 
Stock return volatility 
Profitability 
Stock price runup 
Slack 
Issue size/market value of equity 
Market to book ratio 
Growth in total sales 
Film size 




Post-conversion equity dilution 
Convertible debt market condition 






Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.01  level 









0.003'"  (3.36) 






-0.000* (-1. 73) 
157 
36.75% 
Expected sign (model) 
+ (G, B&K, S) 
+(G,B&K, S) 
+(G, B&K, S) 




- (G)/ + (B&K, S) 
- (G)/ + (B&K, S) 
- (B&K, S) 




+(G, B&K, S) Table XI 
Contingency Table Analysis of Association between Convertible Debt Security Design and 
Convertible Debt Market Condition 
43 
Hot offerings  are  convertibles  issued  during  hot markets,  i.e.  at  least three  contiguous  months  where the  aggregate  real 
conveltible debt issue volume exceeds the upper qU31tile of a three-month moving average of aggregate real conveltible debt 
issue volume. All other conveltibles are labeled 'non-hot'. 'Debt-like' conveltibles have a risk-neutral conversion probability 
lower than the sample average of 32.44%; 'equity-like' conveltibles have a risk-neutral conversion probability higher than or 
equal to the sample average of 32.44%. N is the number of convettibles in each cell. Deviation is the difference between the 
actual cell frequency (= N) and the cell frequency that would be expected if there were no relation between the conveltible 
debt market condition and the  risk-neutral conversion probability.  %  Total  denotes  the  number of offerings  in  each cell 
relative to the total number of offerings for which all the necessary infOlmation is available (i.e. 209). % Rowand % Colunm 
denote the number of offerings in each cell relative to the total number of offerings in the row and colunm, respectively. The 












% Total = 33.49 
%Row= 58.82 
% Colunm = 74.47 
N=24 
Deviation: -16.48 
% Total =11.48 
% Row = 26.67 
% Colunm = 25.53 
94 
*** 
Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.01 level 




% Total = 23.44 
% Row = 41.18 
% Colunm = 42.61 
N=66 
Deviation: 16.48 
% Total = 31.58 
% Row = 73.33 





209 Table XII 
Parameter Estimates of Split-Sample Regressions of the Abnormal Stock Returns Realized at 
Convertible Debt Offering Announcements: Debt-Like versus Equity-Like Convertibles 
44 
'Debt-like' convertibles have a risk-neutral conversion probability lower than the sample average of 32.44%;  'equity-like' 
conveltibles have a risk-neutral conversion probability higher than or equal to the sample average of 32.44%. The dependent 
variable  is  the abnOlmal  stock retum realized on the  conveltible debt  announcement date.  All  film-specific  independent 
variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to t.he  annOlmcement date, unless ot.herwise indicated. Debt ratio is total debt 
divided by total assets. PropOltion of intangibles is intangible assets divided by total assets. Stock retum volatility denotes the 
standard deviation of the  daily  stock  retums  estimated over the  window (-240,  -40)  relative  to  the  announcement date. 
Profitability is  eamings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  Stock price runup  is  the cumulative stock return 
realized over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities 
divided  by total  assets.  Issue  size/market value of equity  is  issue  size  divided by  the  market  value  of common  equity 
measured one week prior to the announcement date. Market to book ratio is  (total assets + market value of common equity 
measured one week prior to the  announcement date - book value of common equity)/total assets.  Growth in total sales is 
(total sales at fiscal year-end immediately after the issue date - total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue 
date  )/total sales at fiscal  year-end immediately prior to the  issue  date.  Film size  is  the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Aggregate conveltible debt volume is a three-month moving average of real conveltible debt issue volume, centered round 
the issue month. Regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the weight is  the standard deviation of the 
market model residuals. t-statistics are inselted in parentheses. 
Independent variable  Debt-like conveltibles 
Intercept  0.102' 
(1.77) 
Firm-sl2.ecifJc I2.roxies  fpr debt-related costs 
Debt ratio  -0.001 
(-0.05) 
PropOltion of  intangibles  -0.079*** 
(-3.40) 
Stock retum volatility  -0.781' 
(-1.80) 
Profitability  0.069' 
(1.75) 
Firm-sl2.eciflc 12roxies fpr equibl--related costs 
Stock price runup  -0.028*' 
(-2.04) 
Slack  -0.038 
(-1.16) 
Issue size/market value of equity  -0.051 
(-1.14) 
Firm-sl2.ecifjc control variables 
Market to book ratio  0.002 
(1.00) 
Growth in total sales  0.003"* 
(2.77) 
Film size  -0.004 
(-1.54) 
Convertible debt market condition 
Aggregate conveltible debt volume  -0.000 
(-1.57) 
Adjusted R2  29.20% 
N  105 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level 





























Parameter  Estimates  of Split-Sample  Regressions  of the  Abnormal  Stock  Returns  Realized  at 
Convertible Debt Offering Announcements: Hot versus Non-Hot Market Convertibles 
Hot market offerings are convertibles issued during hot markets, i.e.  at least three contiguous months where the aggregate 
real conveltible debt issue volume exceeds the upper quartile of a three-month moving average of aggregate real conveltible 
debt issue volume. All other conveltibles are labeled 'non-hot'. The dependent variable is the abnormal stock return realized 
on the conveltible debt announcement date. All film-specific independent variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to 
the announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. Debt ratio is total debt divided by total assets. PropOltion of intangibles is 
intangible  assets  divided by total  assets.  Stock retum volatility  denotes the  standard deviation  of the daily  stock retums 
estimated over the window (-240, -40) relative to the announcement date. Profitability is eamings before interest and taxes 
divided by  total assets.  Stock price runup  is  the cumulative stock retum realized over the window (-75,-1) relative to the 
announcement date. Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. Issue size/market value 
of equity is the issue size divided by the market value of common equity measured one week prior to the announcement date. 
Market to book ratio is (total assets + market value of common equity measured one week prior to the announcement date -
book value of common equity)/total assets. Growth in total sales is (total sales at fiscal year-end immediately after the issue 
date - total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue date)/total sales at fiscal year-end immediately prior to the 
issue date.  Film size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Eurobond dummy is  equal to one for Eurobond offerings, and 
equal to zero for non-Eurobond (i.e.,  domestic or foreign) offerings. Maturity denotes the initial maturity of the  offering. 
Conversion premium is the conversion price divided by the stock price measured one week prior to the announcement date. 
Post-conversion equity dilution is the number of shares issued assuming full conversion ofthe conveltibles divided by (1) the 
total number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end before the offering announcement and (2) the number of shares issued 
assuming full conversion. Regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the weight is the standard deviation 
ofthe market model residuals. t-statistics are inselted in parentheses. 
Independent variable  Hot market conveltibles 
Intercept  0.149** (2.13) 
Firm-specific proxies fOr debt-related costs 
Debt ratio 
PropOltion of intangibles 
Stock retum volatility 
Profitability 
Firm-specific proxies fOr equitv-related costs 
Stock price runup 
Slack 
Issue size/market value of equity 
Firm-specific control variables 
Market to book ratio 
Growth in total sales 
Firm size 










Significant at the 0.10 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 

















Non-hot market conveltibles 
0.034 (0.78) 
0.001 (0.61) 
-0.048** (-2.04) 
-l.079*** (-3.18) 
-0.004 (-0.18) 
-0.006 (-0.40) 
-0.000 (-0.00) 
0.026 (LlO) 
0.001 (0.61) 
0.003*** (3.84) 
-0.002 (-0.98) 
-0.004 (-0.56) 
0.001*" (2.50) 
0.005 (0.28) 
-0.023 (-l.65) 
65.62% 
78 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
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I 